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ABSTRACT
Many nonprofit organizations implement policy through ser-
vice delivery. In addition, these nonprofits serve other roles in
their communities. Policy implementation strategies that over-
look the many roles nonprofits play may misunderstand
implementation challenges or fail to maximize the benefits of
public-nonprofits partnerships. We aim to inform policy imple-
mentation by presenting a narrative that explores the inter-
section of these nonprofit roles and policy implementation
through nonprofit service delivery. We situate this focus on
nonprofits as policy implementers within a framework of non-
profit roles. We present commentary that integrates policy
implementation and nonprofit roles by focusing on four
themes: nonprofit role simultaneity, service delivery/policy
implementation perceptual asymmetry, nonprofit roles over
time, and network participation. Accounting for this multidi-
mensionality can help government actors facilitate partner-
ships that enable service delivery while also recognizing what
nonprofits do independent of their formal arrangements with
governments.
KEYWORDS
Nonprofit roles; policy
implementation; public
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Long-established practices in government contracting enlist nonprofit
organizations to implement public policy (Smith & Lipsky, 1993). In addition
to delivering public services, nonprofits play other roles in their communities.
Nonprofit roles refer to the different kinds of contributions or functions of
nonprofits as they pursue their missions. While the boundaries, understand-
ing, and influence of nonprofit roles continue to evolve (discussed more
below), an early categorization defines these roles as service provision, advo-
cacy, expression, community building, and “value guardian” of individual pro-
social action (Salamon, 2003, pp. 11–14). The nonprofit roles framework
serves to recognize and name the multidimensional motivators or ethos
underlying nonprofit behavior. For example, a soup kitchen may use the pro-
cess of serving food to those in need (service provision) as a way to foster an
inclusive community (community building). Likewise, an after-school tutoring
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nonprofit may view feedback to the local school board (advocacy) as funda-
mentally intertwined with its program activities (service provision). Regardless
of the type of service or program a nonprofit provides, the nonprofit roles
framework emphasizes the potential for each nonprofit to serve multiple
roles while pursuing its mission (Moulton & Eckerd, 2012).
The nonprofit roles framework identifies service provision as one of the
roles through which nonprofit organizations shape their communities, as
well as broader civil society (Salamon, 2003). Nonprofit service provision
may be funded by a variety of sources, including private donors, foundations,
fees-for-service, and public sources. Situating publicly-funded nonprofit
services within a policy process framework reveals another characterization
for these organizations: policy implementers. In other words, public policy
research classifies publicly funded nonprofit service providers as policy
implementers. Acknowledging the intersection between the nonprofit service
provision role and nonprofits as policy implementers offers one example of
how two related literatures—nonprofit management and public policy—
describe the same phenomenon in different terms.
The divergent framing between nonprofit and public policy research can
have adverse consequences for public policy and public management schol-
ars attempting to understand and predict nonprofit behavior. Government
actors might view the process of defining public services as unidirectional:
through the policy process, policymakers and public administrators deter-
mine the ideal mix of goods and services, and then use public resources to
hire nonprofit organizations to meet local demand. This model views non-
profits as responsive partners, where government formulates policies and
distributes resources to nonprofit organizations that customize service pro-
vision to meet local needs (Young, 1998). However, looking at nonprofits
solely as policy implementers ignores the multitude of distinctive roles non-
profits play in democratic society. Accounting for this multidimensionality
can help government actors facilitate partnerships that enable service deliv-
ery while also recognizing what nonprofits do independent of their formal
arrangements with governments.
The purpose of this article is to highlight some of the intersections
between the nonprofit roles framework and nonprofit policy implementation.
We aim to inform policy implementation by presenting a narrative that
articulates these intersections and some of their consequences. We start by
offering a window into the multidimensionality of nonprofits using the non-
profit roles framework. We then provide a brief overview of the practice of
policy implementation through nonprofit service delivery, including some of
the most prominent theoretical foundations guiding scholarship on this
topic. The main contribution of the article is the subsequent commentary
that integrates nonprofit roles and policy implementation by focusing on
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four themes: nonprofit role simultaneity, service delivery/policy implementa-
tion perceptual asymmetry, nonprofit roles over time, and network participa-
tion. We conclude with a discussion that offers avenues for future research.
Nonprofit roles: A framework for understanding nonprofit
multidimensionality
From the perspective of nonprofit scholarship and practice, nonprofit ser-
vice provision—whether publicly funded or not—is just one of the many
ways that nonprofits contribute to or shape their communities. The universe
of nonprofits is large; the Internal Revenue Service’s typology of tax-exempt
organizations includes thirty-seven classifications, including labor unions
and chambers of commerce (Internal Revenue Service, 2018). Within the
501(c)(3) classification for charitable organizations, nonprofits range from
universities to soup kitchens to recreational sports leagues. Even more not-
able, simple classifications based on a particular organizational attribute
overlook important intraorganizational variation in missions, priorities, and
values (Fyall & Levine Daniel, 2018; Fyall, Moore, & Gugerty, 2018).
Recognizing this complexity, the framework of nonprofit roles offers one
way to explore the multidimensionality of nonprofit organizations.
The nonprofit roles framework articulates the scope of functions and/or
contributions nonprofits can make to society at large. Frumkin (2002)
organizes the different nonprofit functions across two dimensions: rationale
(instrumental versus expressive) and orientation (supply-side versus
demand-side). The possible combinations of the rationale and orientation
dimensions result in four functions of nonprofit and voluntary action: ser-
vice delivery, social entrepreneurship, civic and political engagement, and
values and faith. Salamon’s (2003) role categories differ slightly, and corres-
pond more directly to nonprofit contributions to American society: the ser-
vice role, the advocacy role, the expressive role, the community-building
role, and the value guardian role.
Moulton and Eckerd (2012) further the nonprofit role framework using
an empirical approach, developing a nonprofit sector public role index that
more fully defines each role. Their index identifies six distinct roles: service
provision, innovation, political advocacy, citizen engagement, social capital
creation, and individual expression. We adopt the Moulton and Eckerd
classification of nonprofit roles, since it offers the greatest specificity as
well as future opportunities for empirical testing. Figure 1 offers a visual
representation of each nonprofit role to accompany the descriptions.
From a policy perspective, service provision is the most intuitive of the
roles, conveying the transmission of a program or service by the nonprofit
to an identified set of clients or recipients (Figure 1a). Service delivery has
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an instrumental rationale and demand-side orientation, meaning that ser-
vice delivery is outcome-focused and driven by the needs of a nonprofit’s
community. This role coincides well with the idea of nonprofits as policy
implementers, so long as the policymaking entity and nonprofit provider
share a similar perspective on their community’s needs and intended pro-
gram outcomes.
The innovation role also has an instrumental rationale, but with a sup-
ply-side orientation (Figure 1b). Nonprofits prioritizing innovation focus
on new approaches to programs or activities that often represent responses
to external pressures or attempts to manage resource dependencies
(Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009; Levine Daniel & Moulton, 2017; Pfeffer
& Salancik, 1978; Porter, 1979; Vining, 2011). The innovation role encom-
passes the concept of social entrepreneurship, emphasizing the (often) indi-
vidualistic impulse to pursue new solutions for social problems (Dempsey
& Sanders, 2010).
The social capital creation, citizen engagement, and political advocacy
roles are all demand-oriented with expressive rationales. Unlike the out-
come-focused instrumental rationale, the expressive rationale emphasizes
values, meaning, and process. The social capital creation role refers to non-
profits promoting a sense of community and providing a place for people
to feel a sense of belonging. As Figure 1c illustrates, nonprofits prioritizing
their social capital creation roles facilitate relationship development among
their various stakeholders. A focus on social capital can also reflect an
effort to build relationships among those feeling excluded from broader
civil society (Schneider, 2007).
Nonprofits prioritizing the citizen engagement role foster their clients’
direct participation in democratic processes such as promotion of public
education campaigns, voter education and participation, and community
organizing, rather than pursuing specific policy outcomes (Figure 1d).
Here, the nonprofits may not have unified policy preferences but instead
work to amplify the political voices of their clients. The citizen engagement
role embodies de Tocqueville’s observation of voluntary associations as a
crucial training ground for a thriving democracy (Baggetta, 2009;
Tocqueville, 1835). This participation in public life is often viewed as an
expression of social capital (e.g., Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1994));
however, this linkage is not visible in all nonprofits emphasizing these
roles. As such, the two roles deserve separate consideration.
The political advocacy role emphasizes nonprofits as policy advocates,
engaging in and attempting to influence the policy process toward a par-
ticular goal (Figure 1e). Political science scholarship tends to focus on the
advocacy role as carried out primarily by nonprofits without a robust ser-
vice delivery component, such as 501(c)(4) and 527 organizations, but
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nonprofit scholarship illuminates the policy advocacy activities of 501(c)(3)
service providers (Bushouse, 2017). Nonprofit advocacy activities may
include days of action, public comment at city council meetings, public
education events, encouraging supporters to contact their legislators about
an upcoming vote, or employing a lobbyist to represent the nonprofits’
interests (Bass, Arons, Guinane, Carter, & Rees, 2007; Prentice, 2018).
The individual expression role recognizes how nonprofit organizations
reflect the values of their stakeholders, often serving as the “organizational
expression” of stakeholders’ views (Rothschild & Milofsky, 2006, p. 137).
For example, volunteers and donors express their values through the
choices they make in committing time or money, as well as any conditions
they attach to these contributions. Service recipients may also see their pro-
gram involvement as an expression of values—a case that is especially clear
in congregations and other faith-based institutions. The voluntary nature of
nonprofit participation means that each interaction between a stakeholder
and a nonprofit offers the potential opportunity for values expression,
resulting in the circulation of values throughout and across a nonprofit
(Figure 1f).
Nonprofits as policy implementers
As demonstrated in various roles within the nonprofit roles framework,
nonprofit activity frequently intersects with government actors and institu-
tions. Here, we focus on the public sector’s long history of relying on non-
profits to implement public policy. As far back as 1980, Salamon asserts,
“over 40% of the funds spent by federal, state, and local governments in
the United States for a broad range of human service activities supported
delivery by nonprofit organizations” (1993, p. 19). Estimates from 2007
purport that, among local governments, nonprofit organizations account
for approximately 8% of public service delivery overall with significant vari-
ation by service area—nonprofits provide at least 35% of local public serv-
ices in the areas of day care, substance abuse, mental health, homeless
shelters, and arts and culture (Warner & Hefetz, 2008). As for state govern-
ments, a 1998 survey with state executives revealed that 71% of state
administrative agencies contract with the nonprofit sector (Choi, Cho,
Wright, & Brudney, 2005). Recent analyses confirm the longevity of this
arrangement: an estimated $137 billion in public money went to nonprofits
in 2012 (Pettijohn, Boris, De Vita, & Fyffe, 2013).
Given the prevalence of nonprofit providers as policy implementers, the
public policy and public management scholarship draws from its own set
of theories and frameworks in an attempt to unpack the policy implemen-
tation function of nonprofits. We offer a brief review of three of the most
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prominent theoretical frames here: nonprofits as contractors, nonprofits as
network partners, and nonprofits as street-level bureaucrats. We also identify
how each frame rests on assumptions that fail to recognize essential aspects
of nonprofit behavior. Table 1 summarizes each frame, key assumptions, and
overlooked aspects relevant to nonprofits in policy implementation.
Contracting theories are often applied to third-party policy implement-
ers, regardless of which sectors are involved (Fernandez, 2009). The con-
tracting frame originates with the government entity, which may use
transaction costs to inform whether it should contract out, based on factors
like the specificity of the product or service and market availability (Brown
& Potoski, 2003; Williamson, 1981). Once the decision to contract out has
been made, agency theory envisions the contracting relationship as between
a resource-rich principal and a skilled agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). Self-interest
motivates both the principal and the agent, making monitoring and incen-
tive alignment essential for effective contracting.
While agency theory is often applied to public sector contracting, pre-
suming nonprofits are motivated primarily by self-interest is an awkward
fit. Acknowledging the public benefit missions of charitable nonprofits,
public managers may have more success treating nonprofit contractors as
“stewards” rather than “agents” (Van Slyke, 2006). Stewardship theory
maintains the expectation of a resourceful principal but expects greater
goal alignment between public agency and nonprofit provider (Witesman
& Fernandez, 2013). This expected goal alignment favors nonprofit contrac-
tors under certain market conditions, though assumed goal alignment can
Table 1. Nonprofits and Policy Implementation: Theoretical Frames.
Select frames Key concepts Overlooked aspects
Nonprofits as contractors
(Eisenhardt, 1989;
Williamson, 1981;
Witesman & Fernandez,
2013; Van Slyke, 2006)
 Government needs prompt the
relationship.
 Focus is on government-nonprofit (as
contractor) dyad.
 Government is principal; nonprofit is
agent or steward.
 Goal alignment between public
agency and nonprofit provider can be
achieved through contracting process,
given appropriate management
and incentives.
 Relationships in public-nonprofit
partnerships often are less
hierarchical than are traditional
principal-agent arrangements.
 As agents, nonprofits often
have multiple principals.
Nonprofits as network
partners (Agranoff &
McGuire, 2001; Milward
& Provan, 2003)
 Nonprofits participate in policy
implementation as network members.
 Network arrangements can accommo-
date complex interorganiza-
tional dynamics.
 Network management strategies help
foster intended program outcomes.
 Focus on organization overlooks
influence of individual actors.
Nonprofits as street-level
bureaucrats (Barnes &
Henly, 2018; Lipsky,
2010; Maynard-Moody
et al., 1990)
 Like all frontline providers, nonprofits
also influence policy as they
implement it.
 Frontline providers shape public
services through their daily decisions.
 Focus remains on service
delivery, without accounting for
other nonprofit behaviors.
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also be a detriment if it tempts public managers to underinvest in contract
oversight responsibilities (Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2006).
Contracting theories speak to the practicalities of structuring defined part-
nership agreements, but this frame clearly situates the government as the
“principal” actor, thereby downplaying nonprofit complexity. Contracting
theory emphasizes the contract itself, leaving less room to consider the con-
tracting organizations more broadly. Extensions of the competitive contract-
ing model, such as relational contracting, acknowledge the importance of
the contracting organization beyond a single contract (Bertelli & Smith,
2010; Dehoog, 1990), but the focus remains on the government-contractor
dyad to the exclusion of potentially relevant stakeholders and motivations
outside of this relationship.
The concept of resource interdependence is less hierarchical than con-
tracting theories, noting that public-nonprofit partnerships demonstrate
“a simultaneous two-way flow of resources,” such as funds, information,
service delivery capacity, and/or political legitimacy (Saidel, 1991, p. 550).
Some proponents of an interdependence perspective argue, “it is critical
that the balance of power [in public-nonprofit partnerships] be approxi-
mately equal,” thus recommending the strengthening of nonprofit capacity
and leverage in government negotiations (Cho & Gillespie, 2006, p. 505).
In addition, given the multiple stakeholders whose preferences nonprofits
must address, nonprofits are agents with multiple principals whose prefer-
ences reflect varying degrees of power, legitimacy, and urgency (Mitchell,
Wood, & Agle, 1997; Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois, & Jegers, 2012).
In place of an exclusive focus on the relationship between a government
entity and a single nonprofit contractor, scholars frequently use the frame
of networks and collaboration to examine nonprofit policy implementation
among many actors. Rather than a simple “make or buy” decision, empha-
sizing the network considers “multiorganizational arrangements for solving
problems that cannot be achieved, or achieved easily, by single organ-
izations” (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001, p. 296). As compared to contracting
and resource-related theories, a primary strength of the network frame is
the ability to incorporate the influence of complex interorganizational
dynamics, such as the effects of the stability of network relationships on
service delivery, political power and social capital across relationships, and
multisectoral interactions across many actors (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001;
Herranz, 2006; Milward & Provan, 2003; Negoita, 2018).
Although resource dependency and network concepts are able to incorp-
orate the complexity of the nonprofit environment, these organizational-
and network-level frames leave little room for the values and behaviors of
the individual actors comprising nonprofit service organizations. In con-
trast, street-level bureaucracy theory explains the behaviors of frontline
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public service providers in certain conditions (Lipsky, 2010). Research on
street-level bureaucracy tends to include the nonprofit employees within con-
tracting agencies, often examining nonprofit and public employees jointly
(e.g., Barnes & Henly, 2018; Maynard-Moody, Musheno, & Palumbo, 1990).
This theory and related research help convey similarities of frontline workers
regardless of their sector of employment, highlighting the individual-level cop-
ing decisions made by frontline workers and the aggregate effects of such
decisions. The tradeoff of the street-level bureaucracy frame, however, is the
de-emphasis of organizational and sectoral effects, such as the unique func-
tion of nonprofits in policy implementation (Fyall, 2017).
Each of these frames differs in their perspectives on the relationship
between public agencies and their nonprofit partners, but they share a
focus on service delivery. Underscoring this point, network literature usu-
ally specifies if the particular network of interest is a formal service delivery
network, rather than an informal or information-sharing network (Kilduff
& Tsai, 2003)—implying that these network functions can and should be
considered separately. Other nonprofit behaviors may seem irrelevant or
unrelated to policy implementation, but nonprofits may not neatly distin-
guish between “policy-implementing” activities and other organizational
priorities. Indeed, understanding how the multidimensionality of nonprofit
organizations also applies to policy-implementing nonprofits is essential for
facilitating positive public-nonprofit partnerships.
Integrating nonprofit roles and policy implementation
The nonprofit roles framework articulates the diverse contributions and
functions of nonprofit organizations. Policy implementation investigates the
specific function of publicly funded nonprofit service delivery. Policy
implementation fits neatly within the service provision role; however, non-
profits that implement policy also play other nonprofit roles. Theories and
practices that focus exclusively on nonprofits as policy agents through the
service delivery role overlook other roles that can influence policy imple-
mentation and public-nonprofit partnerships. To facilitate a more nuanced
understanding of the intersection between nonprofit roles and policy imple-
mentation, we present four themes that demonstrate how nonprofit multi-
dimensionality can influence nonprofit policy implementation.
Nonprofit role simultaneity
Nonprofit policy implementers simultaneously serve other roles in their
communities. The service provision role indicates a nonprofit policy imple-
menter’s commitment to addressing unmet needs, yet responding to unmet
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community needs is just one of many priorities for nonprofits. Figure 2
illustrates the multidimensionality of nonprofit organizations who serve
multiple roles, and why policy implementation through service delivery
may not be the nonprofit’s sole focus.
A single action or process may fulfill multiple nonprofit roles, necessitat-
ing the qualification of organizational effectiveness “by adding and provid-
ing evidence for ‘according to (whom)’” (Herman & Renz, 1997, p. 202).
Policymakers and those managing contracts with nonprofit providers
appropriately capitalize on the nonprofit role of service provision, yet this
is likely to be just one of many roles realized by the nonprofit, and align-
ment between service provision and other roles is not guaranteed.
Nonprofits may have priorities that are more expressive than instrumental,
such as building social capital among and between stakeholder groups and
offering outlets for individual values. A nonprofit with dual roles of service
provision and individual expression may be reluctant to change its service
delivery mode in order to serve more people if the change would diminish
the volunteer experience.
Government agencies are often aware of the multiple roles of nonprofit
organizations, but these roles tend to be considered in silos—sometimes
intentionally. For example, nonprofits with a strong political advocacy role
use a variety of tactics to communicate their policy preferences to govern-
ment representatives (Fyall, 2016). Public hearings and other venues for
feedback on potential policies are expected outlets for nonprofits’ political
advocacy. Contracting processes for selecting partners tend to focus on a
formal proposal or application; a nonprofit’s priorities outside of the appli-
cation are largely irrelevant to the decision-making process.
Contracting can address some of the potential challenges posed by the
intersection between simultaneous roles and service delivery; however, the
interaction of roles and service delivery can happen outside the contracts.
Figure 2. Roles as an example of nonprofit multidimensionality.
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For example, contracts may specify one type of service but a nonprofit’s
integrated service model may offer unexpected or uncontracted benefits for
clients. In these cases, contract specificity is not a fix because the relevant
activities are external to the contract. In addition, the roles nonprofits pri-
oritize may change midcontract. For example, many nonprofits experienced
increased financial support and engagement from advocacy-oriented stake-
holders following the 2016 Presidential election (Kaplan, 2017). This exter-
nal shock has likely led to changes in role identification and prioritization
that cannot be captured in a contract unless they affect the nonprofit’s abil-
ity to fulfill the contract as promised. More likely, a new role prioritization
influences the character or values espoused by providers without triggering
contract adjustments.
Food pantries run by churches as a venue for the mission-fulfillment of
their congregation provide an example where simultaneous roles can
detract from nonprofit-provided public services. Congregation-affiliated
food pantries are important frontline providers in the emergency food pol-
icy field. National-level policies support and subsidize a substantial portion
of the food commodities provided by food pantries. Yet, many food pan-
tries serve an important role in their congregations as venues for volunteer
service in addition to the benefits to service recipients. Pantries intending
to fulfill an individual expression role in concert with service delivery may
not pursue opportunities to streamline services if they diminish volunteer
autonomy or engagement. This can be a detriment to public policy imple-
mentation in that service quality or quantity may suffer because of the joint
role of individual expression.
Nonprofit service provision/public policy implementation
perceptual asymmetry
Finding nonprofit partners with a strong service provision role does neces-
sarily guarantee successful or effective policy implementation. From a pol-
icy perspective, finding the ideal nonprofit partner(s) relies on two
assumptions: (1) the community in question has nonprofit organizations
with the capacity and willingness to partner; and (2) public and nonprofit
organizations share the same conceptualization of service delivery. In many
communities, however, governments have limited choices about potential
nonprofit partners. Factors related to supply and social structures tend to
explain a community’s nonprofit composition, rather than demand
(Grønbjerg & Paarlberg, 2001), thus affecting the composition and nature
of available partners.
Once a partnership is established, public and nonprofit actors in existing
contractual relationships may both assume a static definition of service
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delivery. However, nonprofits demonstrate philanthropic particularism, the
tendency of nonprofit organizations to serve niche communities rather
than the general public (Salamon, 1995). Policy implementation by non-
profits amplifies their particularistic behavior since the aggregate preferen-
ces of nonprofit providers constitute the public service environment (Fyall,
2016). Particularism influences the expression of the service delivery role,
since nonprofits aim to orient the services they provide toward the prior-
ities of their organizational stakeholders. The varying ways in which non-
profits carry out the service delivery role has implications for the equity
and distribution of public programs and services.
Contract compliance and evaluation often rely on output measures.
While these measures are likely appropriate for examining the aggregate
effects of policy implementation, they may gloss over other service delivery
details, such as program recruitment strategies or service intensity (“the
amount of time committed to individual clients” (Alter, 1990, p. 484)).
By overlooking the breadth of a nonprofit’s service delivery objectives, and
by not being aware of the effects on service delivery they may be inadvert-
ently shaping, government reporting requirements can frustrate nonprofit
partners who feel that their true contributions are not recognized. Sowa,
Selden, and Sandfort (2004) acknowledge the need for both objective and
perceptual measures of effectiveness that allow for organizational and pro-
grammatic variation. Nonprofit roles and the validated nonprofit role index
(Moulton & Eckerd, 2012) can provide some common language for some
perceptual measures.
Nonprofit childcare services exemplify the ways in which goal alignment
between public and nonprofit partners can be challenged by the larger non-
profit context. Many nonprofit childcare centers focus exclusively on their
service delivery role as a childcare provider. The skill and quality of child-
care providers, however, can vary substantially. In thin (generally rural)
markets, nonprofit providers often lack the resources, incentives, and cul-
ture of quality needed to deliver high quality care. As Cleveland &
Krashinsky (2009, p. 459) observe, “If governments are using nonprofit
agencies to deliver service quality, special programs or subsidies directed at
quality improvement are likely to be required for agencies in thin markets.”
In other words, the effectiveness of nonprofit policy implementation
requires more than finding nonprofit partners with a dedication to service
delivery.
Key characteristics of service delivery may also vary substantially within
service-focused nonprofits, as illustrated by different approaches to housing
for those experiencing homelessness. Requests for proposals (RFPs) to
“house the homeless” can yield responses from providers willing to house
the same number from the same target population (such as single adults)
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for the same cost in the same timeframe. However, the philosophical
approach to housing individuals diverges. A “housing first” strategy places
individuals in housing without requiring participation in treatment or
social services. This approach is supported by rigorous research, which
indicates better long-term outcomes when housing is not conditional on
other behaviors. In contrast, a “housing ready” approach maintains that
individuals should earn their access to housing by proving their
“readiness”—often through the adoption of a “clean and sober” lifestyle.
This older strategy uses permanent housing as a carrot to induce prosocial
behaviors, and individuals who do not maintain these behaviors are at risk
of losing their housing. The “housing ready” approach is not supported by
research, meaning that making housing access contingent on service par-
ticipation or other behaviors does not reduce the likelihood of homeless-
ness nor encourage long-term behavioral improvements. While nonprofits
pursuing either strategy may offer competitive proposals, the long-term
implications for policy are likely to differ substantially.
Nonprofit roles over time
Current or past experiences with particular nonprofit providers or provider
arrangements may not guarantee future nonprofit behaviors, in part
because the role(s) nonprofits serve can change over time. Contracting
practices may assume that past performance predicts future behavior, and
that increasing resources from government to the nonprofit will lead to
increases in service delivery. However, unless the mission of the nonprofit
is to execute a single contract, the organization exists outside of this con-
tract. In addition, nonprofit organizations are impacted by changes in the
sociopolitical environments in which they operate (Neal, 2008; Wicker &
Breuer, 2015). Government actors at all levels shape the direction of public
policies. Changes in administration can upset the balance of current
arrangements, as can changes in donor preferences and support levels.
Emergency food provision provides an example of changing roles over
time. As utilization trends change, food pantries have changed their own
interpretation of their role(s). For example, food pantry stakeholders frus-
trated at seeing increasingly chronic need among clients (Berner & O’Brien,
2004) may choose to engage more in political advocacy to address root
issues. Since some nonprofits believe that reliance on public funding has “a
negative impact on the organizational autonomy to take strategic decisions
such as defining the NPOs’ mission, the working procedures, the results to
be achieved, and the target groups to be reached” (Verschuere & De Corte,
2014, p. 304), these organizations may: (a) not to enter into contracts; or
(b) have to accept identity conflicts between the service delivery role and
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the political advocacy that could negatively impact both service provision
and advocacy efforts.
Nonprofit roles and network participation
Roles help explain why nonprofit providers of public services may not be
interested in participating in larger networks. Public service delivery net-
works are now the norm in many policy areas. In fact, funding stipulations
often mandate partnerships among agencies (Doerfel, Atouba, & Harris,
2017). However, factors that affect one-to-one partnerships (role simultan-
eity, perceptions of service delivery, the influence of time), as well as supply
and social structures, also affect network composition and may take on
greater importance in a network setting. Just as organizational identity can
be dynamic, so can networks, which has implications for contract specifica-
tion and formalization (De Corte, Verschuere, & De Bie, 2017). Similarly,
just as nonprofit roles can affect contracts on a dyadic level (e.g., non-
profit-public entity), so too can roles affect membership in and perform-
ance of networks. Nonprofits emphasizing individual expression may not
want to join a community coalition if the nature of other members
presents a conflict. For example, nonprofits involved with reproductive
services nearly always have strong ideological, faith, and/or political foun-
dations that inform an individual nonprofit’s service decisions. Coalition
work across such ideologically diverse nonprofits may be futile, even if the
proposed network goal would benefit all organizations.
In addition, network members bring “differently defined communities
and notions of public interest, which could align, conflict, or co-exist while
not interacting with one another” (Hundley, Brock, & Jensen, 2016, p. 95).
The degree to which these differences matter may reflect the roles nonprof-
its prioritize. Nonprofit organizations emphasizing individual expression
may not see the need to join these networks, especially if their key stake-
holders do not see the need to so (van Raaij, 2006). Similarly, nonprofits
focusing on the creation of social capital may be reluctant to join networks
if they perceive potential negative effects on their ability to focus on rela-
tionship development, especially if the organizations and/or their stakehold-
ers feel excluded from broader civil society. If the networks exhibit values
or goals that do not align with the roles nonprofits choose to emphasize,
network participation may be a nonstarter.
Policy actors may want to reconsider funding requirements tied to net-
working or partnering within the community if this requirement would
alienate otherwise essential partners that do not value network activities.
Recognizing the difference between voluntary and mandated networks, and
the appropriate evaluation criteria for each, may help defuse perceived
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conflict within a network (Willem & Lucidarme, 2014). One criterion
deserving attention is the network’s managing structure. As Piatak,
Romzek, LeRoux, and Johnston (2018, p.170) note, informal management
mechanism help address goal conflict through “shared norms and facilita-
tive behaviors.” Understanding the roles nonprofits play can help service
network coordinators develop targeted strategies that speak to the diversity
of agencies within the network.
Discussion and conclusion
We set out to explore how the multidimensionality of nonprofits affects the
provision of public service as implemented by nonprofit organizations. We
summarize nonprofit roles as an organizing structure for nonprofit com-
plexity. We synthesize common literature relevant to the intersection of
nonprofits and policy implementation (nonprofits as contractors, network
partners, and street-level bureaucrats), highlighting key assumptions as well
as what these frames miss about nonprofits as policy implementers. We
integrate nonprofit roles and policy implementation to explore some of the
challenges presented in using nonprofits as policy implementers, emphasiz-
ing what shapes nonprofit actors’ choices related to service delivery.
Studying nonprofits solely through the lens of implementation fails to tell
the whole story of how and why nonprofits may or may not make ideal policy
implementation partners. As Bushouse (2017, p. 60) notes, “[G]overnment’s
reliance on nonprofit organizations to deliver the services created opportunities
for collaboration but also tensions within nonprofit organizations . . .” She
specifically points to “professionalization and advocacy”; we illustrate how
these tensions extend beyond advocacy to policy implementation. We build on
the work of Moulton and Eckerd (2012) and others to offer a visual represen-
tation of nonprofit roles, and apply the framework to questions of policy
implementation.
From a theoretical perspective, we aim to build a bridge between scholar-
ship on public policy, public management, and nonprofit organizations by
specifically focusing on the intersection between nonprofit roles and policy
implementation. While public policy and management scholarships rarely
engage with the complexity of the nonprofit landscape, nonprofit research
too often overlooks the potential influence of nonprofit behavior on policy
outcomes (Fyall, 2017). Our larger goal in integrating policy implementa-
tion concepts with the nonprofit roles framework is to showcase how exist-
ing research silos inhibit our collective knowledge on the public-nonprofit
dynamic—a finding that others have also asserted (Mitchell & Schmitz,
2019; Pandey & McGinnis Johnson, 2019).
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Future researchers can delve further into the themes identified here to
answer questions about the intersection of nonprofit roles and public pol-
icy, as well as to explore other aspects of nonprofit multidimensionality.
Within the frame of nonprofit roles, we suggest empirical evaluation of
concepts within each theme. Some of this has been done within specific
mission types. For example, Kim (2017) used Moulton and Eckerd’s (2012)
nonprofit roles scale to examine how arts and culture organizations balance
commitment to civic engagement with market-based pressures.
New research within each role can propel related research that looks
across roles. MacIndoe and Beaton (2019) find that nonprofit political
advocacy responds to perceptions of the policy environment. Do these per-
ceptions also influence the relationships between nonprofits and their gov-
ernment funders? Deslatte, Schatteman, & Stokan (2019) conclude that,
among local economic development organizations, divergent nonprofit
forms are associated with different types of land use policies. Can compar-
ing the priorities of other nonprofit roles among these two nonprofit forms
help explain these policy differences?
In addition, we have treated policy implementation as a uniform concept,
but policies can be distributive, constituent, regulative, or redistributive
(Lowi, 1972). Policy type might affect application of our commentary. For
example, policy type might help predict the extent to which roles may
enhance or detract from implementation. Policy type may predict the likeli-
hood of nonprofit roles changing over time, or nonprofit willingness to
join service delivery networks. Future research could explore how variation
in policy type interacts with nonprofit roles. Our narrative also opens up
avenues to explore implementation interventions; for example, the best
way(s) to educate public managers about nonprofit dimensionality and to
evaluate their incorporation into their work with particular nonprofits.
Along these lines, we also suggest there is room to develop heuristics for
incorporating nonprofit roles into contracts and other partnering activities.
Our commentary extends into the network literature and offers opportu-
nities to explore the interaction of networking mechanisms and specific
nonprofit roles. For example, what is the relationship between nonprofit
roles and formal participation requirements for public service networks?
How does this relationship affect service-related outcomes? For nonprofits
emphasizing a social capital role, how does the composition of the network
affect a nonprofit’s willingness to join the network (formally or informally)
or pursue spinoff projects (Shrestha, 2019)?
Our goal was to highlight some of the intersections between nonprofit
roles and public policy implementation. The nonprofit roles framework
offers a window into how the multidimensionality of nonprofits intersects
with this policy implementation. Understanding the four key themes of
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nonprofit role simultaneity, service delivery/policy perceptual implementa-
tion asymmetry, nonprofit roles over time, and network participation can
help maximize the benefits and mitigate the risks of using nonprofits to
implement public policy.
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